

National Security Council Files

1943 Middle East War, 21 October, 1943 — File No. 16

4



DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]				
DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
1	letter	Faisal to the President	10/21/73	B
2	brief	re: Soviet Airlift Flights	10/21/73	B
3	reports	Situation Reports	10/21/73	B
4	cable	Amemb Jidda to Sec State	10/21/73	B
5	cable	The Situation Room to the Secretary	10/21/73	B
FILE GROUP TITLE NSC			BOX NUMBER 1175	
FOLDER TITLE (4)				

RESTRICTION CODES

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 B. National security classified information.  
 C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.  
 D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.


E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.  
 F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.  
 G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.  
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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT  
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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Department of State

WAR  
TELEGRAM

SECRET 497

PAGE 01 TEL AV 08441 212110Z

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00

NSAE-00 DCDE-00 USSS-00 /031 W

045258

P 212034Z OCT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 219  
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM  
USMISSION USUN

SECRET TEL AVIV 8441

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, IS, LE  
SUBJECT: GOL AND FEDAYEEN

REF: BEIRUT 12310, 12321; TEL AVIV 8375; STATE 208635

1. DURING CONVERSATION TODAY WITH FONMIN ABBA EBAN (OTHER SUBJECTS COVERED IN SEPTELS) I TOOK OCCASION TO RAISE ISRAELI INTENTIONS TOWARDS LEBANON AS RESULT OF FEDAYEEN ATTACKS AGAINST NORTHERN CIVILIAN SETTLEMENTS. I NOTED THAT WE WELL UNDERSTOOD THE GOI DESIRE PUNISH PERPETRATORS OF THESE ATTACKS WHICH WERE BEING LAUNCHED FROM LEBANESE SOIL. IN THIS RESPECT, I STATED THAT AMBASSADOR BUFFUM HAD BEEN UNSTINTING IN HIS EFFORTS TO PRESS GOL TO TAKE ACTION TO CONTROL OR AT LEAST INHIBIT FEDAYEEN CROSS BORDER ACTIVITIES. WE ALL, HOWEVER, RECOGNIZED THERE WERE LIMITS ON WHAT THE LEBANESE COULD DO. I NOTED PRECARIOUS SITUATION OF RESIDENT AMERICAN COMMUNITIES IN ARAB COUNTRIES AS RESULT OUR UNQUALIFIED SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL, PARTICULARLY SINGLING OUT THE 5000-6000 AMERICANS IN BEIRUT WHO COULD VERY WELL BE RETALIATED AGAINST IN WAKE OF ANY MASSIVE IDF ATTACK AGAINST LEBANON. I NOTED THAT I WAS SPEAKING WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS BUT I FELT IT MY DUTY TO BRING THIS TO THE ATTENTION OF THE GOI.

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Department of State

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2. EBAN REPLIED THE ISRAELIS HAD SHOWN COMMENDABLE RESTRAINT IN THUS FAR NOT MOUNTING ANY RETALIATORY STRIKES AGAINST THE FEDAYEEN IN LEBANON. HE NOTED, IN THIS RESPECT, THAT DESPITE THE FACT THAT KING HUSSEIN HAD "DECLARED WAR" AND JORDANIAN TROOPS WERE ACTUALLY ENGAGED IN COMBAT IN SYRIA, THE GOI HAD NO INTENTION OF "OPENING A FRONT ON JORDANIAN TERRITORY." IT IS CLEAR, THEREFORE, HE SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE NOT JUST BLOODTHIRSTY. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE HOPED THAT OUR AMBASSADOR IN LEBANON WOULD TAKE AN EARLY OCCASION TO IMPRESS UPON THE GOL THAT NEITHER LEBANON NOR THE FEDAYEEN SHOULD COUNT ON ISRAELI PREOCCUPATION IN THE SINAI OR SYRIA AS IMPEDING ANY MILITARY OPERATION THE GOI SHOULD DECIDE TO MOUNT AGAINST THE FEDAYEEN. HE CONTINUED THAT THE GOL SHOULD CONSIDER THE LACK OF A GOI MOVE AGAINST THE FEDAYEEN TO DATE AS GOOD FORTUNE, BUT THEY SHOULD BE WARNED NOT TO TRY "TO PUSH THEIR LUCK TOO FAR." EBAN CONCLUDED, HOWEVER, THAT HE APPRECIATED HAVING MY LATEST VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT AND WOULD SEE TO IT THAT THEY WERE GIVEN CONSIDERATION.

3. COMMENT. EBAN DID NOT AND WAS OBVIOUSLY UNABLE TO GIVE ANY GUARANTEES RE FUTURE GOI POLICY TOWARDS THE FEDAYEEN IN LEBANON. TO JUDGE FROM HIS COMMENTS, HOWEVER, IT APPEARS THAT AT PRESENT THE GOI HAS NOT GIVEN ITS TROOPS ANY MARCHING ORDERS. AMBASSADOR BUFFUM MIGHT WISH TO RELAY THE SUBSTANCE OF EBAN'S REMARKS TO THE GOL AT A HIGH LEVEL AT THE NEXT APPROPRIATE OCCASION. AT THE SAME TIME, IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO MAKE SURE THE GOL UNDERSTANDS, DESPITE WHAT MAY EMANATE FROM DAMASCUS AND CAIRO, THAT ISRAEL IS FAR FROM BEING ON THE ROPES MILITARILY. IF, HOWEVER, THINGS CONTINUE AS THEY ARE WITH THE 15-20 NORTHERN VILLAGES COMING UNDER FEDAYEEN ATTACK, ROCKET OR OTHERWISE, EBAN GAVE THE CLEAR IMPLICATION THAT THE IDF WOULD BE FORCED TO TAKE ACTION BECAUSE - AS HE PUT IT - THE ISRAELI PEOPLE - PARTICULARLY THOSE IN THE NORTH - "WOULD NOT UNDERSTAND" WHY THEIR GOVERNMENT DID NOT PROTECT THEM.  
KEATING

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Department of State

WAR  
TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 365

3

PAGE 01 JIDDA 04639 211546Z

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSN-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

INRE-00 NSAE-00 USSS-00 /031 W

044418

O R 211445Z OCT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5259  
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI  
USINT ALGIERS  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS  
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN  
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MANAMA  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
USMISSION OECD PARIS  
AMEMBASSY ROME  
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI  
AMEMBASSY VIENNA

CONFIDENTIAL JIDDA 4639

EXDIS

MOSCOW FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER

DEPT ALSO FRO CAIRO

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: ENRG, SA, XF

SUBJECT: PLANNED DROP IN SAUDI OIL PRODUCTION

REF JIDDA 4621 (NOTAL)

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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
PAGE 02 JIDDA 04639 211546Z

SUMMARY: TOTAL PLANNED DROP IN SAUDI PRODUCTION MAY REACH 1.4 MILLION BARRELS PER DAY OVER PLANNED OUTPUT FOR OCTOBER AND 2-MILLION BARREL DROP OVER PLANNED OUTPUT FOR NOVEMBER FROM ARAMCO ALONE. LOSSES TO U.S. BECAUSE OF BOYCOTT COULD BE ONE MILLION B/D (MBD) OR MORE. UK IS CONSULTING WITH JAPANESE OVER STEEP PRICE RISES, WHICH BOTH VIEW AS "INTOLERABLE." END SUMMARY.

1. ARAMCO PRESIDENT JUNGERS BRIEFED EMBOFFS MORNING OCT 21 REGARDING CUT-BACK AND EMBARGO ON U.S. SHIPMENTS. HE SAID THEY HAD RECEIVED ONE TERSELY AND SOMEWHAT LOOSELY WRITTEN LETTER FROM MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM TELLING THEM TO CUT BACK PRODUCTION BY TEN PERCENT LESS THAN SEPTEMBER PRODUCTION LEVEL OF 8.29 MBD, I.E. TO 7.46 MBD. THEIR OCTOBER FORECAST HAD CALLED FOR AN AVERAGE OF 8.76 MBD AND ACTUAL PRODUCTION ON OCT 18 HAD BEEN OVER 8.9 MBD. THEREFORE, HE CONCLUDED THAT THE TEN-PERCENT CUT-BACK BY SAUDI ARABIA MENAS A LOSS OF MORE THAN 1.4 MBD IMMEDIATELY FROM WORLD PRODUCTION.

2. ARAMCO HAD NOT YET BEEN OFFICIALLY INFORMED ABOUT EMBARGO ON U.S. SHIPMENTS BUT HAD DECIDED IT MUST VISIBLY OBEY ROYAL DIWAN ANNOUNCEMENT. NONE OF THE TANKERS WAITING AT PRESENT FOR U.S. DESTINATIONS WILL NOW BE LOADED. ARAMCO'S PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT (PROTECT SOURCE) WAS THAT THE EMBARGO ON SHIPMENTS TO U.S. MIGHT MEAN LOSS OF OVER ONE MBD OF CURRENT IMPORTS, IF SAG CHOSE TO IMPLEMENT BAN ON SHIPMENT TO OFFSHORE REFINERIES AS WELL AS DIRECT SHIPMENTS FROM SAUDI ARABIA. DIRECT SHIPMENTS HAD AVERAGED 390,000 B/D DURING FIRST NINE MONTHS. HOWEVER, DURING SEPTEMBER THIS HAD SOARED TO 600,000 B/D AND HAD PROBABLY REMAINED THERE DURING FIRST TWO WEEKS OCTOBER. IN ADDITION, 350,000 B/D WERE BEING SENT TO OFFSHORE REFINERIES IN BAHAMAS, TRINIDAD AND CURACAO FOR U.S. MARKET, AND PETROLEUM PRODUCTS DIRECTLY SHIPPED TO U.S. FROM RAS TANURA WERE RUNNING AT 74,000 B/D. THIS DID NOT INCLUDE CRUDE TO BAHRAIN FOR REFINING AND EVENTUAL SHIPMENT TO U.S. OR USG MILITARY OFFSHORE USERS FROM REFINERY THERE, NOW DID IT INCLUDE SHIPMENTS FROM SAUDI ARABIA TO CANADA, SOME OF WHICH ENDED EITHER IN U.S. OR IN RELEASING CANADIAN OIL FOR U.S. MARKET; AND FINALLY, IT DID NOT INCLUDE ANY OF THE 260,000 B/D OF FUEL OIL SHIPMENTS FROM EUROPEAN REFINERIES, PART OF WHICH WERE FROM SAUDI CRUDE. HE CONCLUDED THAT THE TOTAL LOSS MIGHT BE AT LEAST ONE MILLION

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TELEGRAM

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B/D AND COULD RUN SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER.

3. JUNGERS NOTED THAT THEY HAD HOPED THE TEN-PERCENT CUT WOULD BE AGAINST PLANNED OCTOBER PRODUCTION LEVELS BUT THIS HAD NOT BEEN DONE, AND THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE ORIGINALLY PLANNED OCTOBER AND ACTUAL PRODUCTION NOW SET AT 7.4 MBD WAS MORE THAN 1.3 MBD. NOVEMBER PRODUCTION WAS SCHEDULED AT OVER 9.4 MBD, OR A SHORTFALL IN WORLD PRODUCTION OF TWO MBD EVEN ASSUMING NO FURTHER CUTS. DECEMBER OF COURSE REMAINED IN QUESTION.

4. JUNGERS NOTED THAT SAG HAD IMPLEMENTED NEW PRICE ON POSTINGS UNILATERALLY BUT HAD NOT DONE SO PUBLICLY. NEW PRICES ARE \$7.14 AT SIDON AND \$5.11 AT RAS TANURA. (INITIAL INDICATIONS ARE THAT AT NEW PRICE LEVELS SAG WILL ACTUALLY INCREASE ITS MONTHLY INCOME EVEN AT LOWERED PRODUCTION LEVELS. ESTIMATES WILL FOLLOW.)

5. WE HAVE LEARNED FROM JAPANESE EMBASSY HERE THAT PRIME MINISTER HEATH AS LATE AS OCT 16 PROPOSED BY OFFICIAL LETTER TO GOJ THAT MITI AND JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTRY CONSULT WITH UK EMBASSY IN TOKYO OVER NEW PRICES PREPARATORY TO A MEETING OF OIL COMMITTEE OF OECD IN PARIS. HEATH'S MESSAGE HAD SAID THAT NEW PRICES WERE INTOLERABLE BURDEN ON UK AND OTHER CONSUMER COUNTRIES AND THAT THEY MUST COLLECTIVELY DO SOMETHING ABOUT THEM. (UNILATERAL 10-PERCENT CUT AND EMBARGO BY ARABS ON U.S. FOLLOWED THIS MESSAGE FROM LONDON TO TOKYO.)  
AKINS

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*11/21*  
**TELEGRAM**

UNCLASSIFIED 559

PAGE 01 USUN N 04117 220348Z

16  
ACTION IO-14

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 NEA-10 ISO-00 AF-10 ARA-16 EA-11 RSC-01  
SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 USSS-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00  
DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04  
PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 ACDA-19 MC-02 OMB-01 DRC-01 SAJ-01

/173 W

046435

O 220335Z OCT 73 ZFF6  
FM USMISSION USUN NY  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 402  
INFO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY AMMAN NIACT IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY LONDON NIACT IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY PARIS NIACT IMMEDIATE  
USINT CAIRO NIACT IMMEDIATE  
AMCONGEN JERUSALEM NIACT IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS USUN 4117

E.O. 11652: NA  
TAGS: PFOR, UNSC, ME  
SUBJ: MIDDLE EAST--SECURITY COUNCIL


FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION SUBMITTED TO SC  
EVENING OCT, 21 BY US AND USSR.

BEGIN TEXT:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

1. CALLS UPON ALL PARTIES TO THE PRESENT FIGHTING TO  
CEASE ALL FIRING AND TERMINATE ALL MILITARY ACTIVITY  
IMMEDIATELY, NO LATER THAN 12 HOURS AFTER THE MOMENT

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*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

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OF THE ADOPTION OF THIS DECISION, IN THE POSITIONS THEY  
NOW OCCUPY.

2. CALLS UPON THE PARTIES CONCERNED TO START  
IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE CEASEFIRE THE IMPLEMENTATION  
OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 IN ALL OF ITS PARTS.

3. DECIDES THAT IMMEDIATELY AND CONCURRENTLY WITH  
THE CEASEFIRE, NEGOTIATIONS START BETWEEN THE PARTIES  
CONCERNED UNDER APPROPRIATE AUSPICES AIMED AT  
ESTABLISHING A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE IN THE  
MIDDLE EAST. END TEXT.  
SCALI

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SECRET/EXDIS

War  
21 Oct

S (3)  
S-I  
S-M  
S-S  
PC

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Operations Center

MIDDLE EAST TASK FORCE  
Situation Report #50

SA Situation Report in the Middle East as of 0600 EDT, 10/21/73

IR Military Situation

The IDF spokesman announced morning of October 21 (210530Z) that action during the night had been confined to artillery fire on both fronts with IDF forces in Sinai reorganizing for today's action. Several rocket and bomb attacks against northern Israeli settlements took place but there were no casualties.

IR (LDX)  
DD (LDX)  
IA (LDX)  
SA (LDX)  
A/HO

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CA  
Y  
CI

The IDF briefing of the USDAO evening of October 20 indicated that the situation of the IDF task force west of the Suez Canal was fairly static in the north and central sectors but relatively active in the southern portion. The IDF is pushing south along the Canal toward Suez City, bypassing elements of the Egyptian 4th armored division and driving a wedge between it and 3rd Army units on the east bank. The IDF bridgehead has expanded to the southern tip of Great Bitter Lake and Israeli tanks are firing at Egyptian units on the east bank. The IDF push toward Egyptian 3rd Army Headquarters near Jebel Jafra continues. According to the IDF most Egyptian units are holding fast.

The IDF estimates Egyptian tank strength on both sides of the Canal at approximately 500. The only major effective Egyptian fighting units west of Canal are two armored brigades. East of the Canal the Egyptians still have 4 infantry divisions, elements of another, and parts of the 21st Armored Division. The USDAO reports that the IDF destroyed 4 SAM sites in the southern area of Great Bitter Lake but the other sites on the west bank between the lake and Suez City remain. The IAF lost 2 Phantoms and one Mirage October 20 in attacks against Port Said and Qantara. The IDF claims Egyptian losses of 8 MIG 21 and 3 SU-7 aircraft in attack against Israeli

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GDS - DECLASS Dec. 31, 1981

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bridges across the Canal.

Updated IDF figures of Soviet airlift October 21 indicate 32 AN-12 and 3 AN-22 flights to Egypt and 19 AN-12 and possibly one AN-22 flight to Syria.

A reliable Jordanian army source claims that the Syrian Defense Minister is pressuring the Jordanian Chief of Staff to commit an additional brigade in Golan.

The Lebanese military have reports that 4 Iraqi divisions will be committed to the Syrian front, and that the Baghdad/Damascus road was thick with Iraqi forces the night of October 19.

#### Arab Reaction

The Arab press continues to claim Arab successes on both fronts. A Cairo Voice of the Arabs commentary October 20 attacked the U.S. as the main enemy of the Arabs and urged using all weapons -- military, political and economic -- against U.S. interests. There are still no indications of unrest in Arab capitals and there have been no reports of hostile actions against American communities.

#### No Mercenaries in IDF

Israeli Major General Narkiss denied to newsmen Egyptian charges that mercenaries are serving in the IDF. He acknowledged, however, that the IDF includes some dual nationals, including one U.S./Israeli killed in action Monday.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE OPERATIONS CENTER
APPROVED BY: <i>Regina M. E.H.</i>
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS

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War

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Operations Center

MIDDLE EAST TASK FORCE  
Situation Report #52

/S (3)  
/S-I  
/S-M  
/S-S  
/PC

Situation Report in the Middle East as of 1830 EDT, 10/21/73

U.S.-USSR

Press reports state the White House announced tonight that the U.S. and the USSR have agreed on a common approach to peace in the Middle East and have requested a meeting of the United Nations Security Council later in the evening.

Egyptian Front

There are wide discrepancies between reports from the two sides on the fighting in Egypt. Israeli sources report that their forces now are mopping up a 500 square mile area on the west bank of the Canal. They state that one wing of the northern task force has reached the outskirts of Ismailia and the other wing has cut the main Cairo-Ismailia road and rail links, thereby threatening a major Egyptian supply base further west. The central task force, 20 miles west of the Canal, has not extended itself. Two wings of the IDF southern task force are reportedly blocking the southern Cairo-Suez road with artillery fire so that no trains or daylight traffic are able to pass to or from Suez. The Egyptian Fourth Division, engaging the southern column, has mustered approximately 200 tanks, while 300-400 Egyptian tanks are dispersed along the east bank. If the Israelis manage to cut the Cairo-Suez route and continue to block the Cairo-Ismailia road, DIA estimates the Egyptian forces on the east bank would have only three to five days supplies remaining.

An Egyptian spokesman, in the first Egyptian military briefing of the 16-day old war, said that the Israeli bridgehead was barely six miles inside Egypt, that it had been chopped up into two pockets, and that they were being attacked by thousands of Egyptian soldiers.

Syrian Front

There was limited fighting in Syria. However, a report from a sensitive source indicates the Syrians hope to launch...

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IA (LDX)  
SA (LDX)  
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SECRET/EXDIS

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an offensive within the next 48 hours to regain the October 6, 1973 lines. Also, Jordan plans to move a second brigade into Syria October 22.

Other Arab/Israeli Developments

Boumedienne today called on all western European countries to prevent shipment of arms and volunteers to Israel through their territories. An intelligence report indicates that because of U.S. support for Israel Arafat may be rethinking his decision at the beginning of the war not to sanction fedayeen terrorist operations against the U.S. Eban told Ambassador Keating October 21 that the GOI has no intention of "opening a front on Jordanian territory." Regarding continued rocket attacks from Lebanon, Eban said the Lebanese have been lucky so far, but should not push their luck.

Oil

A report from Aramco states that although Saudi Arabia has cut oil production by 10 percent based on September production, the cut is in fact nearly 20 percent if one starts with October production rates, which are significantly higher than September. Loss to world production will be 820,000 barrels per day off the September rate plus 600,000 barrels from the October production increase underway. Aramco has ceased to load any tankers with U.S. destinations, thus halting the September flow to the U.S. of 600,000 barrels per day. If Saudi Arabia implements its ban on indirect shipment to the U.S. through Caribbean refineries, the immediate loss to the U.S. from Aramco sources alone could be one million barrels per day, or about 5.5 percent of U.S. consumption. Cuts by other Arab countries could bring another one million barrel per day cut for the U.S. immediately. Also, cuts in U.S. imports could be much higher if normal shipments of fuel from Canada and Europe dry up in the world shortage.

Evacuation

The Emergency and Evacuation situation remains as reported previously, e.g., all reporting posts indicating evacuation not necessary at present. However, relative to Cairo we have arranged for the M.S. Knossos to standby at Piraeus for immediate sailing to Alexandria if required.

APPROVED BY: 

DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS

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TELEGRAM

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ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 IO-14 ISO-00 ACDA-19 AF-10 OMB-01 EUR-25 EB-11

SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 PM-07 L-03 NSC-10 CIAE-00

DODE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 USIA-15 PRS-01

SPC-03 DRC-01 CCO-00 /148 W

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R 212034Z OCT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0221  
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 6458  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
USINT CAIRO  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM  
USMISSION USUN NY

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 8443

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, XF, IS

SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST PEACE SETTLEMENT

1. COMMENTATOR HAGGAI ESHED IN IMAGINATIVE PIECE IN DAVAR  
OCT 21 CALLS ON GOI TO PURSUE FOLLOWING, AND TO DO SO QUICKLY:  
A) MEANINGFUL US-USSR AGREEMENT LIMITING MIDDLE EAST ARMS  
RACE.  
B) PUBLIC DECLARATION OF ISRAELI POSITION ON SECURE BOUNDARIES  
NEEDED BY ISRAEL, AND OF ISRAEL'S READINESS TO WITHDRAW ITS  
FORCES TO THESE BORDERS IN STAGES, AFTER SEING IMPLEMENTATION  
OF POINTS A AND C).  
C). OPENING OF SUEZ CANAL AND RESUMPTION OF NAVIGATION THROUGH  
IT FOR ALL NATIONS, INCLUDING ISRAEL.

2. ESHED -- NO DOVE IN PAST -- EXPRESSES VIEW THAT ALTHOUGH  
SECURE BORDERS ARE ESSENTIAL FOR ISRAEL, THIS WAR HAS PROVED  
THEY ARE NOT SUFFICIENT AND NOT EVEN MAIN ELEMENT FOR ISRAEL'S  
SECURITY. MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENT IS: US-USSR AGREEMENT ON /

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LIMITING ARMS SUPPLIES.)

3. ESHED STATES RE ISRAEL-EGYPT BOUNDARY THAT ISRAEL SHOULD SATISFY ITSELF WITH "YARIV MAP." EMBOFF CONTACTED ESHED AND ASKED WHAT "YARIV MAP" IS. ESHED SAID IT WAS DRAWN UP IN JANUARY 1971 UNDER COMMITTEE HEADED BY GENERAL YARIV AS CONTINGENCY FOR JARRING TALKS AND CONTAINED VARIOUS POSSIBLE LINES, FROM MAXIMAL TO MINIMAL. ALTHOUGH EMBOFF PRESSED, ESHED INSISTED HE DID NOT KNOW WHERE MINIMAL OR ANY OTHER LINE IN YARIV MAP WAS LOCATED.

4. ESHED TOOK OCCASION TO VOLUNTEER TO EMBOFF THAT NO ONE IN GOI PUT HIM UP TO ARTICLE, THAT HE HAD NOT HEARD ISRAELI OFFICIALS TALKING ALONG THESE LINES, AND THAT ARTICLE CONTAINED STRICTLY HIS OWN IDEAS.

5. COMMENT. WE ARE UNABLE TO EVALUATE ESHED'S DENIAL STORY IS PLANT. ESHED HAS BEEN CONDUIT FOR THINKING OF VARIOUS OFFICIALS IN PAST. WE NOTE OTHER PAPERS HAVE CARRIED NOTHING SIMILAR TO ESHED PIECE IN RECENT DAYS.  
KEATING

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DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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OP IMMED /ROUTINE  
CSA412PAA234  
DE RUEKRA #4639 2941515  
O R 211445Z OCT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5259

INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 144  
USINT ALGIERS 239  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 4644  
USMISSION FC BRUSSELS 124  
AMCONSUL DHAKRA 6042  
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 2040  
AMEMBASSY LONDON 2669  
AMEMBASSY MANAMA 319  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 91  
USMISSION OECD PARIS 834  
AMEMBASSY ROME 456  
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 1328  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 674  
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 75  
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 496  
AMEMBASSY VIENNA 55

C O N F I D E N T I A L JIDDA 4639

EXDIS  
MOSCOW FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER  
DEPT ALSO FOR CAIRO  
E.O. 11652: GDS  
TACS: ENRG, SA, XF  
SUBJECT: PLANNED DROP IN SAUDI OIL PRODUCTION  
REF JIDDA 4621 (TOTAL)

SUMMARY: TOTAL PLANNED DROP IN SAUDI PRODUCTION MAY REACH  
1.4 MILLION BARRELS PER DAY OVER PLANNED OUTPUT FOR OCTOBER  
AND 2-MILLION BARREL DROP OVER PLANNED OUTPUT FOR NOVEMBER  
FROM ARAMCO ALONE. LOSSES TO U.S. BECAUSE OF BOYCOTT COULD  
BE ONE MILLION B/D (MBD) OR MORE. UK IS CONSULTING WITH JAPANESE  
OVER STEEP PRICE RISES, WHICH BOTH VIEW AS "INTOLERABLE." END  
SUMMARY.

1. ARAMCO PRESIDENT JUNGERS BRIEFED EMBDEFS MORNING OCT 21  
REGARDING CUT-BACK AND EMBARCO ON U.S. SHIPMENTS. HE SAID

\*\*\*\*\* W H S R C O M M E N T \*\*\*\*\*

SCOWCROFT, MUWE, MCFARLANE, QUANDT, KNUBEL, SECFL

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THEY HAD RECEIVED ONE TERSLY AND SOMEWHAT LOOSELY WRITTEN LETTER FROM MINISTRY OF PETRULLUM TELLING THEM TO CUT BACK PRODUCTION BY TEN PERCENT LESS THAN SEPTEMBER PRODUCTION LEVEL OF 8.29 MBD, I.E. TO 7.46 MBD. THEIR OCTOBER FORECAST HAD CALLED FOR AN AVERAGE OF 8.76 MBD AND ACTUAL PRODUCTION ON OCT 13 HAD BEEN OVER 8.9 MBD. THEREFORE, HE CONCLUDED THAT THE TEN-PERCENT CUT-BACK BY SAUDI ARABIA MENAS A LOSS OF MORE THAN 1.4 MBD IMMEDIATELY FROM WORLD PRODUCTION.

2. ARAMCO HAD NOT YET BEEN OFFICIALLY INFORMED ABOUT EMBARGO ON U.S. SHIPMENTS BUT HAD DECIDED IT MUST VISIBLY COPY ROYAL DIWAN ANNOUNCEMENT. NONE OF THE TANKERS WAITING AT PRESENT FOR U.S. DESTINATIONS WILL NOW BE LOADED. ARAMCO'S PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT (PROTECT SOURCE) WAS THAT THE EMBARGO ON SHIPMENTS TO U.S. MIGHT MEAN LOSS OF OVER ONE MBD OF CURRENT IMPORTS, IF SAG CHOSE TO IMPLEMENT BAN ON SHIPMENT TO OFFSHORE REFINERIES AS WELL AS DIRECT SHIPMENTS FROM SAUDI ARABIA. DIRECT SHIPMENTS HAD AVERAGED 300,000 B/D DURING FIRST NINE MONTHS. HOWEVER, DURING SEPTEMBER THIS HAD SOARED TO 600,000 B/D AND HAD PROBABLY REMAINED THERE DURING FIRST TWO WEEKS OCTOBER. IN ADDITION, 350,000 B/D WERE BEING SENT TO OFFSHORE REFINERIES IN CAHAMAS, TRINIDAD AND CURACAO FOR U.S. MARKET, AND PETROLEUM PRODUCTS DIRECTLY SHIPPED TO U.S. FROM RAS TANURA WERE RUNNING AT 74,000 B/D. THIS DID NOT INCLUDE CRUDE TO BAHRAIN FOR REFINING AND EVENTUAL SHIPMENT TO U.S. OR USC MILITARY OFFSHORE USERS FROM REFINERY THERE, NOR DID IT INCLUDE SHIPMENTS FROM SAUDI ARABIA TO CANADA, SOME OF WHICH ENDED EITHER IN U.S. OR IN RELEASING CANADIAN OIL FOR U.S. MARKET; AND FINALLY, IT DID NOT INCLUDE ANY OF THE 260,000 B/D OF FUEL OIL SHIPMENTS FROM EUROPEAN REFINERIES, PART OF WHICH WERE FROM SAUDI CRUDE. HE CONCLUDED THAT THE TOTAL LOSS MIGHT BE AT LEAST ONE MILLION B/D AND COULD RUN SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER.

3. JUNGERS NOTED THAT THEY HAD HOPED THE TEN-PERCENT CUT WOULD BE AGAINST PLANNED OCTOBER PRODUCTION LEVELS BUT THIS HAD NOT BEEN DONE, AND THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE ORIGINALLY PLANNED OCTOBER AND ACTUAL PRODUCTION NOW SET AT 7.4 MBD WAS MORE THAN 1.3 MBD. NOVEMBER PRODUCTION WAS SCHEDULED AT OVER 7.5 MBD, OR A SHORTFALL IN WORLD PRODUCTION OF TWO MBD EVEN ASSUMING NO FURTHER CUTS. DECEMBER OF COURSE REMAINED IN QUESTION.

4. JUNGERS NOTED THAT SAG HAD IMPLEMENTED NEW PRICE ON POSTINGS UNILATERALLY BUT HAD NOT DONE SO PUBLICLY. NEW PRICES ARE \$7.14 AT SIDON AND \$5.11 AT RAS TANURA. (INITIAL INDICATIONS ARE THAT AT NEW PRICE LEVELS SAG WILL ACTUALLY INCREASE ITS MONTHLY INCOME EVEN AT LOWERED PRODUCTION LEVELS. ESTIMATES WILL FOLLOW.)

5. WE HAVE LEARNED FROM JAPANESE EMBASSY HERE THAT PRIME

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MINISTER DEATH AS DATE AS SET TO PROPOSED BY OFFICIAL LETTER TO  
GOJ THAT WILL BE JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTRY CONSULT WITH  
EMBASSY IN TOKYO OVER NEW PRICES PREPARATION TO A MEETING OF  
OIL COMMITTEE OF OPEC IN PARIS. DEATH'S MESSAGE INDICATES THAT  
NEW PRICES WERE INTOLERABLE FOR OPEC IN AND OTHER OIL-PRODUCING  
COUNTRIES AND THAT THEY WOULD COLLECTIVELY TOY WITH OPEC ABOUT  
THEM. (UNILATERAL 17-PERCENT CUT AND EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON D.C.  
FOLLOWED THIS MESSAGE FROM LONDON TO TOKYO.)

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OP IMMED  
ESA422RAA249  
DE RUESKA #4640 2941555  
O 211545Z OCT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5260  
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL JIDDA 4640

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: MARR, SA, PFOR, XF  
SUBJECT: SAUDI MINISTER CLAIMS US PLANES DIRECTLY RESUPPLY IDF

1. MINISTER HISHAM NAZER, HEAD OF CENTRAL PLANNING ORGANIZATION, TODAY TOLD FORMER PANAM CHIEF NAJEEB HALABY OCT 21 THAT "USAF IS FLYING C-5A AIRCRAFT DIRECTLY INTO AIRFIELDS IN SINAI, WHERE THEY BEING SERVICED BY USAF GROUND CREWS AND SUPPLY CORPSMEN."

2. WE OBVIOUSLY CAN'T RUN TO GROUND EACH RUMOR AS IT EMERGES ON ARAB-ISRAEL SCENE; BUT WOULD BE USEFUL -- CONSIDERING NAZER'S POSITION AND INFLUENCE -- IF WE COULD GET WORD TO HIM HIS BELIEF UNFOUNDED.

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PRIORITY /ROUTINE  
ESC030  
DE RUEHMD #3126 2941045  
PAR 211022Z OCT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3239

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON 4184  
AMEMBASSY PARIS 1355  
USMISSION USUN 3242

C O N F I D E N T I A L

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE MOSCOW 13126  
E.O. 11652: N/A  
TAGS: PFOR UR US XF  
SUBJECT: SOVIET PRESS ON ME

1. SUMMARY: PRAVDA COMMENTARY MORNING FOLLOWING SECRETARY'S ARRIVAL SAYS ARAB CAUSE HAS ALREADY ACHIEVED DEGREE OF SUCCESS IN ME WAR AND REITERATES SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO PLAY ROLE IN ASSURING PEACE IN AREA. COMMENTARY ASSERTS THAT USSR'S SOLIDARITY WITH ARABS IS NOT SOURCE OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION NOR IS IT OBSTACLE TO BUSINESSLIKE CONTACTS ON OTHER QUESTIONS. NEWSPAPERS, TV, AND RADIO PLAY SECRETARY'S VISIT PROMINENTLY. PRESS GIVES SPARSER COVERAGE THAN IN LAST FEW DAYS TO U.S. MILITARY SUPPORT OF ISRAEL. BATTLE REPORTS ACKNOWLEDGE ISRAELI GAINS ON WEST BANK OF SUEZ CANAL.  
END SUMMARY

2. PRAVDA WEEKLY INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OCTOBER 21 DVCHINNIKOV ASSERTS THAT ARAB PERFORMANCE IN ME WAR HAS ALREADY SHOWN WORLD HIGH FIGHTING SPIRIT OF EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN FORCES AND THEIR DETERMINATION TO EXPEL CONQUERORS FROM OCCUPIED LANDS. DVCHINNIKOV NOTES THAT ISRAELI LOSSES CAUSED DISARRAY IN TEL AVIV AND GOLDA MEIR TURNED TO U.S. TO PREVENT ISRAELI COLLAPSE. EVENTS, HE SAYS, HAVE DEMONSTRATED THAT ISRAELI THEORY OF SECURE BOUNDARIES IS FATAL FOR ISRAEL, AND NEITHER ANNEXATION OF TERRITORY NOR SABRE-RATTLING WILL GUARANTEE ISRAEL'S SECURITY. DECLARING THAT ONLY BASIS FOR LASTING PEACE IS GOOD-NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS BETWEEN

\*\*\*\*\*WHSR COMMENT\*\*\*\*\*

JANKA, HOWE, MCFARLANE, SECFL

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ISRAEL AND HER ARAB NEIGHBORS, ARTICLE CONTINUES THAT SOVIET UNION FAVORS A JUST AND STABLE PEACE IN ME WITH GUARANTEED SECURITY FOR ALL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES OF THE REGION. NOVICHENKOV WRITES THAT USSR IS WILLING TO DO ITS SHARE IN ASSURING SUCH A PEACE: KOSYGIN HAS GONE TO CAIRO AND BREZHNEV AND GROMYKO HAVE TALKED WITH KISSINGER IN ME. CLAIMING THAT OPPONENTS OF DETENTE ARE ATTEMPTING TO USE ME CONFLICT TO THEIR OWN ENDS, HE DENIES THAT SOVIET SOLIDARITY WITH ARABS IS SOURCE OF INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS OR AN OBSTACLE TO BUSINESSLIKE CONTACTS WITH USSR ON OTHER MATTERS IN PARTICULAR IT DOES NOT HINDER SUCCESSFUL CARRYING ON OF CSCE.

3. 3. IN DISCUSSING DANISH PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT, NOVICHENKOV PLAYS UP SOVIET INTEREST IN DETENTE, BUT RECALLS KOSYGIN STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 15 THAT USSR COMMITMENT TO DETENTE WILL NOT BE EXERCISED AT EXPENSE OF PRINCIPLE OF STRONG OPPOSITION TO IMPERIALIST AGGRESSION.

4. PRAVDA OCTOBER 21 FRONT-PAGES SECRETARY'S ARRIVAL (NO PICTURE) AND REPORT OF TALKS WITH BREZHNEV AND GROMYKO EVENING OF OCTOBER 20. SOVIET PARTICIPANTS: L. L. BREZHNEV, GROMYKO (BUT NOT KOSYGIN, WHO RETURNED FROM CAIRO OCTOBER 19), DUBKOV, BREZHNEV ASSISTANT ALEXANDROV, AN MEA USA DESK CHIEF KORNIYENKO. SECRETARY'S ARRIVAL RECEIVED UNUSUALLY PROMPT TV COVERAGE ON EVENING NEWS PROGRAM; OCTOBER 20 VIDEOTAPE WAS PRESENTED BY ANNOUNCER WITH MARKED AIR OF SATISFACTION.

5. PRAVDA PLAYS PRESIDENT'S REQUEST FOR SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATION FOR ISRAELI STRAIGHT, AND INCLUDES PRESIDENT'S WORDS THAT REQUEST IS MOTIVATED BY NEED TO SUPPORT BALANCE AND PRESERVE STABILITY IN ME. ALSO REPORTED IS TASS ITEM (CITING WESTERN PRESS) SAYING U.S. AIR IS INCREASING AND AMERICA HAS DELIVERED 130 PHANTOM AND SKYHAWK AIRCRAFT AND NOT LESS THAN 350 TANKS TO ISRAEL. RED STAR CARRIES ADDITION TO SAME ITEM SAYING U.S. DELIVERIES HAVE REACHED 1000 TONS DAILY. *right* *Wrong*

6. BATTLE REPORTS OCTOBER 21 CONCIDE ISRAELI ADVANCES ON WEST BANK OF CANAL WHILE ASSERTING THAT ISRAEL CONTINUES TO LOSE PLANES. PAPERS CARRY EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT DECISION THAT FOREIGN VOLUNTEERS WILL BE TREATED AS MERCENARIES. ON LEBANON, PRAVDA AND RED STAR REPORT THAT ISRAEL SHELLING OF LEBANESE CIVILIAN TARGETS IN SOUTH CONTINUES. IZVESTIYA REPORTS LEBANESE PARLIAMENTARY

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SPOKESMAN (ASAD) CALLED IN PARLIAMENT TO URGE  
CONTINUED GOV. SUPPORT OF ARAB COMBATANTS.  
DUPS  
PT

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21 Oct

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OP IMMED /ROUTINE  
PSA348A0012  
DE RUSSAD #8425 2941149  
O R 211134Z OCT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0213

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0451  
AMEMBASSY BLIRUT 5002  
USINT CAIRO 3592  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 4906  
USMISSION USUN NY 1097

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 0425

RU 11052: GDS  
TAGS: PDR PLINT IS US  
SUBJ: DAYAN ON PRE-WAR US ARMS SUPPLY TO ISRAEL

1. DAYAN IN RADIO-TV INTERVIEW YESTERDAY COMPLAINED BATHER  
POINTEDLY ABOUT AN ALLEGED US UNWILLINGNESS TO SUPPLY CERTAIN  
WEAPONS TO ISRAEL BEFORE WAR. DAYAN IS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID  
THAT "IF SOMEONE HAS TO MAKE AN ACCOUNT, IT IS THE AMERICANS"  
WHO REFUSED TO SELL ISRAEL "PERSONAL ANTI-TANK WEAPONS AND  
OTHERS," AND HAD "BARGAINED WITH US ON EVERY BIT OF A PLANE AND  
ON THE TIMING OF SUPPLIES AND THERE WERE OTHER KINDS OF ARMS  
THEY REFUSED TO SUPPLY, AND THE EGYPTIANS HAD EVERYTHING."

Sen. Jackson  
will love

2. COMMENT. DAYAN HAD JUST BEEN ASKED IF THE WAR DID NOT  
INDICATE A NEED FOR CHANGES IN ISRAEL'S SECURITY DOCTRINE.  
BEFORE GOING ON TO POINT A FINGER AT THE US, DAYAN GAVE  
DEFENSIVE-SOUNDING EXPLANATION FOR BUILDING OF BARLEV LINE  
AT CANAL, WHICH FELL SO QUICKLY.

3. OUR SOURCES HAVE BEEN TELLING US THAT DAYAN IS BEING BLAMED  
BY MANY FOR SUPPOSEDLY FAULTY MILITARY DOCTRINE IN INTER-WAR  
PERIOD, CONTRIBUTING TO IDF DIFFICULTIES IN EARLY DAYS OF WAR, AND  
THAT DAYAN'S POLITICAL FUTURE MAY EVEN BE IN SOME JEOPARDY. MY  
OPINION IS THAT THESE STORIES ABOUT DAYAN BEING IN POLITICAL TROUBLE  
MAY HAVE SOME SUBSTANCE AND THAT HIS CRITICISM OF US PRE-WAR  
ARMS SUPPLY SHOULD BE SEEN IN THIS LIGHT AND OF COURSE THERE WAS  
MUCH TRUTH IN WHAT HE SAID.

4. NEVERTHELESS, I FELT THAT DAYAN'S REMARKS COULD NOT GO

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ENTIRELY DOMINATED BY OUR SIDE IN INTERESTS OF DISCHARGING TO US  
ISRAELIS WHO MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO TRY TO PROTECT THEMSELVES  
POLITICALLY BY MAKING US SCAPGOATS. I THEREFORE HAVE PLAYED TO  
FOREIGN MINISTRY THIS MORNING AND EXPRESSION OF MY "OF SPECIAL  
CONCERN" OVER AYA'S REMARKS. I HAVE NO DOUBT MY AMBASSADOR  
WILL FIND ITS WAY QUICKLY THROUGH EBAN TO DAYAN.

2. I ALSO RECOGNIZE, HOWEVER, THAT IT IS POSSIBLE AYA'S COMMENT  
ABOUT US ARMS-SUPPLY RESTRAINT BEFORE THIDDP SHOULD BE OF SOME  
VALUE TO US. IT COULD HELP UNDERSCORE AN ESSENTIAL TRUTH ABOUT  
ARMS SUPPLY TO PARTIES IN CONFLICT: THE US EXERCISED RESTRAINT  
WHILE THE SOVIETS PLOKED ARMS FREELY INTO ARAB ARSENALS PRIOR  
TO OCT 6.  
PLATTNC  
BT

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CTG: 211134, OCT 72

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OP IMMED  
DE RULHC #8774 2940705  
O 210650Z OCT 73 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 6046

INFO SECDEF

S E C R E T STATE 208774

TUSEC 50  
E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, MAKR, RA  
SUBJ: MIDEASTFOR AGREEMENT ENDED BY BAHRAIN  
REF: MANAMA 0671

1. WE HAVE REPEATED TO YOU REFTEL REPORTING BAHRAIN GOVERNMENT'S NOTICE OF ENDING MIDEASTFOR STATIONING AGREEMENT AS WELL AS COMMENTS CONTAINED IN KUWAIT 3838. WHILE BAHRAINI DECISION MAY BE IRREVERSIBLE, PARA 14 OF STATIONING AGREEMENT DOES PROVIDE ONE-YEAR PERIOD FROM NOTIFICATION TO CANCELLATION AND BELIEVE WE SHOULD TRY PROCEED DELIBERATELY IN LIGHT OF EVOLVING SITUATION.

2. FOLLOWING FOR YOUR APPROVAL IS PROPOSED MESSAGE TO MANAMA. QUOTE: A. CHARGE SHOULD INFORM FOMMIN THAT USG TAKES NOTE OF BAHRAIN'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF TERMINATION OF MIDEASTFOR STATIONING AGREEMENT. WE REGRET GOVERNMENT OF BAHRAIN'S ACTION WHICH COMES AT TIME WHEN USG IS UNDERTAKING MOST ACTIVE AND ENERGETIC EFFORTS DIRECTED TOWARD ACHIEVING A CEASEFIRE AND PROGRESS TOWARD A LASTING SETTLEMENT OF MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT. HOWEVER, CONSUNANT WITH SPIRIT OF CLOSE AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, USG WILL RESPECT THE WISHES OF BAHRAIN GOVERNMENT. UNQUOTE.

3. DDD CONCURS FOREGOING. FLAGSHIP DUE RETURN BAHRAIN OCTOBER 23 FROM VISIT SINGAPORE. WE PLAN CONSULT WITH

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POST AS TO WHETHER THIS WILL CREATE SECURITY PROBLEM IN  
LIGHT PREVIOUS DEMONSTRATIONS.

4. AS REPORTED MANAMA 671, GDB ANNOUNCED ITS DECISION  
AT 1330Z OCTOBER 20. PENDING RESPONSE FROM YOU TO THIS  
MESSAGE, WE WILL BE TELLING PRESS THAT WE HAVE BEEN  
OFFICIALLY INFORMED OF GDB'S ACTION AND HAVE MATTER UNDER  
CONSIDERATION. RUSH  
BT

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21 Oct  
Iraq

OP IMMED /ROUTINE  
CRZ163  
DL RUEHCR #0571/41831 2941745  
P R 211200Z OCT 73  
FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 001

INFO AMEMBASSY RIAD 26

S E C R E T BAGHDAD 571

F.O. 11652: GDI

TAGS: PFOR EMR 12 US

REF BAGHDAD 557

SUPJ: US LOSES PIPELINE CONTRACT

1. 150 MILLION DOLLAR CONTRACT FOR CONSTRUCTION STRATEGIC PIPELINE SIGNED OCT 19 WITH ITALIAN GROUP LED BY STAL PROGETTI. JAPANESE AND FRENCH SUPPLYING PIPE VALUED AT 90 MILLION DOLLARS. PROJECT TO TAKE 22 MONTHS.

2. THIS APPEARS TO BE CLEAR CASE OF AMERICAN COMPANIES LOSING OUT FOR POLITICAL REASONS. WIDELY BELIEVED CONTRACT WOULD GO TO EITHER NEILL-PRICE/SPIL/MANESMANN GROUP OR BECHTEL/WILLIAMS BROS/ENTREPOSE GROUP WITH AMERICAN PARTNER IN BOTH GROUPS DOING CONSTRUCTION INVOLVING THE LIA OF SEVERAL HUNDRED AMERICANS. ITALIANS WERE ONLY OTHER COMPETITOR. ITALIAN COMMERCIAL ATTACHE TOLD ME OCT 16 THAT ITALY OUT OF RUNNING AND ITALIAN AMBASSADOR HAD MADE LAST DITCH DEMARCHE TO MINPET HAMMADI OCT 15 WITHOUT SUCCESS. SWITCH APPARENTLY MADE AT LAST MINUTE BY POLITICAL LEADERSHIP.

3. COMMENT: TOGETHER WITH POLITICALLY MOTIVATED OCT 7 NATIONALIZATION OF EXXON AND MOLLE, THIS IS SERIOUS BLOW TO OUR HOPES FOR SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAQ. WHILE THERE IS AS YET NO SIGN THAT GDI WILL REPEAL OR RECENT CONTRACTS WITH BROWN AND ROOR, BOEING AND OTHERS, AS WAR CONTINUES AND US PERCEIVED AS ENEMY, SUCH STEPS CAN BE ANTICIPATED. LOWRIE  
BT

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DP IMMED  
ST0774  
DE RUQPSDA #8512 2941315  
O 211315Z OCT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA BAHRAIN

TO SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE 0924

INFO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 0909  
ZEN/COMIDEASTFOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAMA 0612

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS : PHOR, MARR, BA  
SUBJECT : MIDEASTFOR AGREEMENT  
REFS : A) MANAMA 0669  
B) KUWAIT 3828

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER DELIVERED TO CHARGE BY AFA  
OCT 21: (NON-ESSENTIAL WORDS OMITTED):  
A. FOLLOWING DISCUSSIONS OCT 13 AND 20 IN CONNECTION WITH  
AGREEMENT OF DEC 23, 1971 RELATING TO DEPLOYMENT IN BAHRAIN  
OF MIDEASTFOR, I HEREBY WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT GUB DESIRES TO  
NOTIFY USG OF ITS INTENTION TO TERMINATE SAID AGREEMENT,  
~~SUBJECT TO MINIMUM PERIOD PROVIDED FOR IN AGREEMENT.~~  
B. HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN MIDDLE EAST,  
GUB HOPES VERY MUCH THAT US WILL BE IN POSITION TO TERMINATE  
~~ARRANGEMENTS UNDER ABOVE-MENTIONED AGREEMENT DURING A MUCH~~  
~~EARLIER PERIOD THAN THAT PROVIDED FOR IN THE AGREEMENT.~~  
C. ARRANGEMENTS FOR MUTUAL TERMINATION OF AGREEMENT WILL BE  
MADE AS SOON AS I RECEIVE YOUR REPLY TO THIS LETTER.  
/S/ MUHAMMAD BIN MUBARAK AL-KHALIFA, MINISTER OF FOREIGN  
AFFAIRS.

2. COMMENT: LANGUAGE IN PARA 1 B OF LETTER STRONGER THAN THAT  
USED BY FONMIN TO CHARGE. (REF A PARA 3). THIS MAY REPRESENT  
PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE STAND RATHER THAN HARDENING OF GUB  
POSITION AT THIS TIME.

STARRETT

BT

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Wo  
21 Oct

PRIORITY /ROUTINE  
ESA483AUA078  
DE RUE SAD #8442 2942110  
P R 212034Z OCT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 220 /

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 6457  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 5008  
USINT CAIRO 3597  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 4991  
USMISSION USUN 3903

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 8442

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFUR, PCFT, IS, US  
SUBJECT: DASRN ON PRE-WAR US ARMS SUPPLY TO ISRAEL  
REF: TEL AVIV 8425

1. DURING MY MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER EBAN TODAY, (OTHER SUBJECTS COVERED IN SEPTELS) HE TOOK INITIATIVE THROUGH HIS AIDES TO RAISE SUBJECT OF MY UNHAPPINESS OVER DAYAN'S REPORTED REMARKS. EBAN SAID HE COULD WELL UNDERSTAND MY REACTION TO THIS STATEMENT AND HE HAD SPOKEN TO BOTH PRIMIN MEIR AND DEEMIN DAYAN ABOUT THIS. HE MADE SOME, FOR HIM, UNCHARACTERISTIC, INARTICULATE NOISES ABOUT WHAT DAYAN MEANT TO SAY AND THEN EMPHASIZED THAT THE PRIMIN AND ALSO DAYAN WANTED US TO KNOW THAT DAYAN AND THE ENTIRE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT WERE IN THE FOREFRONT OF THOSE ISRAELIS WHO WERE "RHAPSODIC" IN THEIR GRATITUDE AND APPRECIATION FOR US SUPPORT. I REPLIED THAT I WAS HAPPY TO HAVE THIS CLARIFICATION WHICH I WOULD PASS ON IMMEDIATELY TO WASHINGTON.
2. I ALSO TOOK THE OCCASION TO NOTE THAT I COULD UNDERSTAND THE TEMPTATION FOR AN ISRAELI POLITICIAN TO TRY TO PASS OFF SEXE DOMESTIC PRESSURE TO THE US. THIS DID NOT MEAN, HOWEVER, THAT WE WOULD ACCEPT SUCH ACTIONS.
3. COMMENT, I BELIEVE WE HAVE NOW MADE OUR POINT. HOPEFULLY OUR ISRAELI FRIENDS WILL BE PARTICULARLY PRUDENT ABOUT THIS SUBJECT IN THE FUTURE.

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21 Oct

PRIORITY  
ESA481ADA077  
DE RUEHAD #8441 2942100  
P 212034Z OCT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 219

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 5007  
AMEMBASSY AMMAN 6456  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 4990  
USMISSION USUN 3902

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 8441

EXDIS

F.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, IS, LE

SUBJECT: GOL AND FEDAYEEN

REF: BEIRUT 12310, 12321; TEL AVIV 8375; STATE 208635

1. DURING CONVERSATION TODAY WITH FONMIN ABBA EBAN (OTHER SUBJECTS COVERED IN SEPTELS) I TOOK OCCASION TO RAISE ISRAELI INTENTIONS TOWARDS LEBANON AS RESULT OF FEDAYEEN ATTACKS AGAINST NORTHERN CIVILIAN SETTLEMENTS. I NOTED THAT WE WELL UNDERSTOOD THE GDI DESIRE PUNISH PERPETRATORS OF THESE ATTACKS WHICH WERE BEING LAUNCHED FROM LEBANESE SOIL. IN THIS RESPECT, I STATED THAT AMBASSADOR BUFFUM HAD BEEN UNSTINTING IN HIS EFFORTS TO PRESS GOL TO TAKE ACTION TO CONTROL OR AT LEAST INHIBIT FEDAYEEN CROSS BORDER ACTIVITIES. WE ALL, HOWEVER, RECOGNIZED THERE WERE LIMITS ON WHAT THE LEBANESE COULD DO. I NOTED PRECARIOUS SITUATION OF RESIDENT AMERICAN COMMUNITIES IN ARAB COUNTRIES AS RESULT OUR UNQUALIFIED SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL, PARTICULARLY SINGLING OUT THE 5000-6000 AMERICANS IN BEIRUT WHO COULD VERY WELL BE RETALIATED AGAINST IN WAKE OF ANY MASSIVE IDF ATTACK AGAINST LEBANON. I NOTED THAT I WAS SPEAKING WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS, BUT I FELT IT MY DUTY TO BRING THIS TO THE ATTENTION OF THE GDI.

2. EBAN REPLIED THE ISRAELIS HAD SHOWN COMMENDABLE RESTRAINT IN THUS FAR NOT MOUNTING ANY RETALIATORY STRIKES AGAINST THE FEDAYEEN IN LEBANON. HE NOTED, IN THIS RESPECT, THAT DESPITE THE FACT THAT KING HUSSEIN HAD "DECLARED WAR" AND JORDANIAN TROOPS WERE ACTUALLY ENGAGED IN COMBAT IN SYRIA, THE GDI HAD NO INTENTION OF "OPENING A FRONT ON JORDANIAN TERRITORY." 1 :\$29 8

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33-4, THEREFORE, HE SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE NOT JUST BLOODTHIRSTY. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE HOPED THAT OUR AMBASSADOR IN LEBANON WOULD TAKE AN EARLY OCCASION TO IMPRESS UPON THE GOL THAT NEITHER LEBANON NOR THE FEDAYEEN SHOULD COUNT ON ISRAELI PREOCCUPATION IN THE SINAI OR SYRIA AS IMPEDING ANY MILITARY OPERATION THE GOI SHOULD DECIDE TO MOUNT AGAINST THE FEDAYEEN. HE CONTINUED THAT THE GOL SHOULD CONSIDER THE LACK OF A GOI MOVE AGAINST THE FEDAYEEN TO DATE AS GOOD FORTUNE, BUT THEY SHOULD BE WARNED NOT TO TRY "TO PUSH THEIR LUCK TOO FAR." EBAN CONCLUDED, HOWEVER, THAT HE APPRECIATED HAVING MY LATEST VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT AND WOULD SEE TO IT THAT THEY WERE GIVEN CONSIDERATION.

3. COMMENT. EBAN DID NOT AND WAS OBVIOUSLY UNABLE TO GIVE ANY GUARANTEES RE FUTURE GOI POLICY TOWARDS THE FEDAYEEN IN LEBANON. TO JUDGE FROM HIS COMMENTS, HOWEVER, IT APPEARS THAT AT PRESENT THE GOI HAS NOT GIVEN ITS TROOPS ANY MARCHING ORDERS. AMBASSADOR RUFFUM MIGHT WISH TO RELAY THE SUBSTANCE OF EBAN'S REMARKS TO THE GOL AT A HIGH LEVEL AT THE NEXT APPROPRIATE OCCASION. AT THE SAME TIME, IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO MAKE SURE THE GOL UNDERSTANDS, DESPITE WHAT MAY EMANATE FROM DAMASCUS AND CAIRO, THAT ISRAEL IS FAR FROM BEING ON THE ROPES MILITARILY. IF, HOWEVER, THINGS CONTINUE AS THEY ARE WITH THE 15-20 NORTHERN VILLAGES COMING UNDER FEDAYEEN ATTACK, ROCKET OR OTHERWISE, EBAN GAVE THE CLEAR IMPLICATION THAT THE IDF WOULD BE FORCED TO TAKE ACTION BECAUSE - AS HE PUT IT - THE ISRAELI PEOPLE - PARTICULARLY THOSE IN THE NORTH - "WOULD NOT UNDERSTAND" WHY THEIR GOVERNMENT DID NOT PROTECT THEM.

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ROUTINE  
DE RUEHC #8801 2942200  
R 212149Z OCT 73  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0413

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN 0101  
AMEMBASSY PARIS 7879  
AMEMBASSY LONDON 8538  
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 8260  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 3030  
USMISSION DEGD PARIS 3702  
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 5487  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 8114

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 208801

E.O.: 11652: GDS  
TAGS: ENRG, PFDR, JA  
SUBJ: JAPANESE CONCERN RE MIDDLE EAST

REF : TOKYO 13617

1. ACTING NEA ASST SECY DAVIES BRIEFED JAPANESE CHARGE  
YAMAZAKI OCTOBER 20 AT LATTER'S REQUEST. DAVIES COVERED  
MILITARY SITUATION ON GROUND AND RECOUNTED DIPLOMATIC  
EFFORTS BY USG TO CRYSTALLIZE CONSENSUS ON ENDING CONFLICT.

2. YAMAZAKI ASKED WHETHER SOVIETS ARE NOW SERIOUS IN  
SEEKING CEASEFIRE. DAVIES REPLIED HE RELIEVED SO,  
PARTICULARLY IN VIEW FACT THAT SECRETARY'S MOSCOW TRIP WAS  
AT SOVIET INVITATION. HOWEVER DAVIES NOTED SOVIET PUBLIC  
POSITION STILL SEEKING CEASEFIRE ON TERMS CALLED FOR BY  
ARABS AND NOT NECESSARILY IN TERMS APPROPRIATE AS BASIS  
FOR NEGOTIATION OF BASIC ARAB ISRAELI ISSUES, WHICH IS  
WHAT USG HOPES FOR. WHILE USG URGENTLY WORKING FOR SUCH  
CEASEFIRE IT CANNOT STAND ASIDE WHEN MASSIVE SOVIET  
RESUPPLY EFFORT POSES THREAT OF SERIOUS MILITARY  
IMBALANCE.

3. DRAWING ON FON MINY CABLE REPORTING JOINT DEMARCHE BY

\*\*\*\*\*WHSR COMMENT\*\*\*\*\*

QUANDT, SFELDT, FROEBE

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ARAB AMBASSADORS IN TOKYO OCTOBER 19 (TOKYO 13617, YAMAZAKI INDICATED ARABS HAVE GIVEN VAGUE ASSURANCES THAT THEY INTEND APPLY OIL CUTBACKS ONLY TO UNFRIENDLY COUNTRIES,

BUT YAMAZAKI WAS NOT SURE ARABS DO NOT SEE JAPAN AS UNFRIENDLY. HE PLACED EXCERPTS OF FUN MINY CABLE WHICH INDICATED FUN MIN HAD AVOIDED TAKING ARAB POSITION BUT EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING OF IT, AND ASKED THAT ARABS UNDERSTAND JAPAN'S SENSITIVE POSITION.

4. DAVIES NOTED THAT NOT ALL JAPANESE OIL SUPPLIES COME FROM ARAB COUNTRIES CONSIDERING PRODUCTION CUTBACKS, AND REFERRED TO IRANIAN OIL WHICH NOT INVOLVED IN CURRENT CONFLICT. IN RESPONSE YAMAZAKI'S QUESTION, DAVIES SAID SAUDIS HAD TAKEN STEP OF PERCENTAGE CUT IN OUTPUT RELUCTANTLY, IN RESPONSE TO HEAVY ARAB PRESSURES, WHILE USG FOR ITS PART HAD MADE CLEAR TO SAUDIS WE WERE ACTING IN MIDDLE EAST ONLY TO PREVENT SERIOUS IMBALANCE, AND WERE EARNESTLY SEEKING A CEASEFIRE WHICH WOULD LEAD TO PEACE WITH HONOR FOR ALL. DAVIES NOTED THAT ARABS IN APPLYING OIL EMBARGO TO OTHER COUNTRIES MUST WEIGH THE FACT THAT THEY STILL NEED FRIENDS. MEANWHILE EFFECT OF ANNOUNCED CUTBACKS MAY NOT HAVE IMMEDIATE ADVERSE IMPACT, AND IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN HOW ARABS WILL ACTUALLY IMPLEMENT THEM.

5. YAMAZAKI ASKED WHETHER PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY REALLY HAD HAD CORDIAL MEETING WITH THE FOUR ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS AS PRESS REPORTED. DAVIES SAID THE TALKS HAD BEEN DESCRIBED AS FRIENDLY AND FRUITFUL, AND PART OF MUCH BROADER DIPLOMATIC PICTURE. HE URGED YAMAZAKI TO REPORT THAT USG IS INDEED DEEPLY ENGAGED IN SEEKING A CONSTRUCTIVE OUTCOME TO THE CONFLICT, AND THAT WE HAVE VERY MUCH IN MIND THE NEEDS AND INTERESTS OF OUR FRIENDS SUCH AS JAPAN.

6. IN CONTEXT OF ASKING THAT WE INFORM JAPANESE PERIODICALLY ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS, YAMAZAKI MENTIONED SEN. MANSFIELD'S PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD INCLUDE JAPAN AS "MAJOR POWER", ON BASIS HER ENERGY REQUIREMENTS, AT CONFERENCES ON MIDDLE EAST. DAVIES SAID USG HAD NOT FORMULATED POSITIONS ON MODALITIES. YAMAZAKI WOULD UNDERSTAND SENSITIVITY OF POLITICAL PROCESS IN EVOLVING POSITIONS BUT WE WELCOME EXCHANGES TO PROMOTE UNDERSTANDING AND COOPERATION. ALL MAJOR ENERGY CONSUMERS WILL HAVE TO WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER IN FUTURE, AND WE

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AVAILABLE FOR TALKS WHENEVER EMBASSY WISHED.  
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